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The 2007–8 global financial crisis has shown the failure of private finance to efficiently allocate 
capital to finance real capital development. The resilience and stability of Brazil’s financial 
system has received attention, since it navigated relatively smoothly through the Great 
Recession and the collapse of the shadow banking system. This raises the question of whether it 
is possible that the alternative approaches followed by some developing countries might provide 
an indication of more stable regulatory approaches generally. There has been much discussion 
about how to support private long-term finance in order to meet Brazil’s growing infrastructure 
and investment needs. One of the essential functions of the financial system is to provide the 
long-term funding needed for long-lived and expensive capital assets. However, one of the main 
difficulties of the current private financial system is its failure to provide long-term financing, as 
the short-termism in Brazil’s financial market is a major obstacle to financing long-term assets. 
In its current form, the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) is the main 
source of long-term funding in the country. However, BNDES has been subject to a range of 
criticisms, such as crowding out private sector bank lending, and it is said to be hampering the 
development of the local capital market. This paper argues that, rather than following the 
traditional approach to justify the existence of public banks—and BNDES in particular, based 
on market failures—finding an effective answer to this question requires a theory of financial 
instability. 
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I. WHY DOES BRAZIL’S BANKING SECTOR NEED PUBLIC BANKS? 
 
Rather than justifying the existence of public banks, and BNDES in particular, using an 
argument based on market failures (Garcia 2011), an effective answer to this question requires a 
theory of financial instability. The 2007–2008 global financial crisis had a profound impact on 
the state of modern economics. It exposed the failure of mainstream economics, and led to some 
understanding of the inherent instability of capitalism and how to prevent depressions. 
Moreover, the conventional approach had disastrous economic policy consequences that 
contributed to the Great Recession. Entering the global crisis, mainstream economists believed 
“the state of macro is good” (Blanchard 2009, p.2). People who were believed to have a 
sophisticated understanding of economics did not understand what we were getting into during 
the bubble years, and they repeatedly dismissed ample warnings about growing financial 
fragility and instability in the economy. For instance, Arminio Fraga, ex-president of the Central 
Bank of Brazil from 1999–2002, and currently a hedge fund manager, proclaimed the following 
in 2005 during the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium: 
[w]e are moving towards more complete markets. Presumably this is a good thing. I do 
see from my vantage point at the ground level that risk is going where it belongs. It is, in 
fact, a good innovation because small investors don’t like banks to take a lot of risk. So, 
traders and banks move out to hedge funds and they are there met by more sophisticated 
investors. Banks in the old days were paid to grow their loan books, I can’t think of a 
worse incentive, and that is the way they were compensated…Investment managers 
today, however risky their business may be, tend to care about their reputations and tend 
to have their money on the line. That is healthy and it is being delivered by the market 
on its own…As an investor, I have a pretty easy time looking at funds and figuring out 
what they are doing. It is nearly impossible to know what the large financial institutions 
we have in this planet are doing these days…That is, in my view, probably an argument 
to say we may be better off than before…Perhaps because of all this we see less of an 
impact of all these financial accidents on the real economy now than we did see in the 
1980s when it took years to clear markets, for banks to start lending again, and for the 
economies to start moving (Fraga 2005, 389–390). 
The unfolding of the global economic crisis has called into question both the 
conventional approach and mainstream economists’ reputations. In a recent article about the 
state of macroeconomics , the IMF’s chief economist Olivier Blanchard, confessed where 
danger really lurks, that is, in the minds and models of an orthodox economist. He 
acknowledged that “[traditional models have] a worldview in which economic fluctuations 
occurred but were regular, and essentially self correcting. The problem is that we came to 
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believe that this was indeed the way the world worked” (Blanchard 2014:28). As Wray (2011) 
pointed out: 
The global crisis exploded reigning orthodoxy. Among those theories and claims 
that should no longer be taken seriously by any macroeconomist we must include: 
rational expectations and continuous market clearing; New Classical and Real Business 
Cycle approaches; neutral money; the New Monetary Consensus, the Taylor rule, and 
the Great Moderation; the Efficient Markets Hypothesis; Ricardian equivalents and other 
versions of the policy irrelevance doctrine; and claims made by advocates of 
deregulation and self-regulation. To be sure, we have been here before. The Great 
Depression also exploded the reigning orthodoxy. Keynes offered a revolution in 
thought. Unfortunately, that revolution was aborted, or, at least, co-opted by 
“synthesizers” who borrowed only the less revolutionary aspects of his theory and then 
integrated these into the old Neoclassical approach. The important insights of Keynes 
were never incorporated in mainstream macroeconomics. Eventually, Neoclassical 
theory was restored. It is now time to throw it out, to see what should be recovered from 
Keynes, and to update Keynes’s theory to make it relevant for the world in which we 
actually live (Wray 2011, p.7). 
 
Why is this discussion important? During the pre-crisis period, developed countries’ 
regulatory systems had been considered as “best practice” and formed the basis for 
recommendations to developing countries seeking to liberalize and expand their domestic 
financial markets. Once more, the crisis fatally discredited notions that free-market economies 
are inherently stable. It discredited the belief in self-regulation and supervision, as well as 
arguments against regulation, based on the idea that markets would undertake due diligence 
resulting in optimal outcomes and that market prices act as signals that agents react to in a 
Pareto-optimal manner. The crisis has shown the failure of private finance to efficiently allocate 
capital to finance real capital development.  
The Great Recession called into question the “light touch” regulatory approach practiced 
in the US and the UK, and produced an ad-hoc response to the financial crisis. In spite of 
massive expansion of central banks’ balance sheets in developed economies aimed at bailing out 
financial institutions and their intervention in private credit markets, it had little impact in terms 
of increasing credit to the private non-bank sector. The crisis response has raised two 
fundamental questions. First, the regulatory and supervisory framework put in place in advanced 
nations before the 2007–2008 global financial crisis failed to capture and avoid the build up of 
financial fragility in the economy. While the mainstream view of finance and the proper 
regulatory approach have been called into question, Minsky’s alternative approach provides a 
framework to investigate structural changes in the domestic financial architecture and help the 
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appropriate designing of the existing regulatory and supervisory policies to constrain the 
development of financial fragility in the economy and deal with severe systemic crises (Kregel 
2014). In this approach, the destabilizing effects of stability on financial structures calls for 
dynamic adjustments to policy frameworks and brings about the need to redesign the regulatory 
structure to continually meet its objectives of financial stability and to provide funding for 
development and financing for innovation.  
Second, to the extent that the financial structure that emerged in the US financial system 
in the past 30 years failed to provide support for the capital development of the economy and 
improve living standards, an alternative design of the financial structure that meets the needs of 
developing nations needs to be developed. For instance, the UNCTAD report noted the 
following: 
At present, flaws in credit allocation by deregulated private banks and difficulties in 
reestablishing the supply of credit for the real sector in developed economies (despite 
expansionary monetary policies) have led to a renewed interest in credit policies. For 
instance, in July 2012 the Bank of England established a temporary Funding for Lending 
Scheme, with the goal of incentivizing banks and building societies to boost their 
lending to the country’s real economy…The Bank of Japan had launched a similar 
initiative in 2010…However, these initiatives are frequently introduced as extraordinary 
measures for dealing with exceptional circumstances. There are strong arguments in 
favour of central bank and government intervention to influence the allocation of credit 
in normal times, especially in developing countries. Such credit should aim at 
strengthening the domestic forces of growth and reducing financial instability, since 
long-term loans for investment and innovation and loans to micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises are extremely scarce even in good times (UNCTAD 2013, p.134–135). 
In this regard, the resilience and stability of Brazil’s financial system has received 
attention as it navigated relatively smoothly through the 2007–2008 global financial crisis and 
the collapse of the shadow banking system.  
 
II. WHY DOES BRAZIL’S BANKING SECTOR NEED BNDES? 
 
There has been much discussion about how to support private long-term finance to meet 
Brazil’s growing infrastructure and investment needs. One of the essential functions of the 
financial system is to provide long-term funding needed for long-lived and expensive capital 
assets. However, one of the main challenges posed by the current private financial system is its 
failure to provide long-term financing. The short termism in Brazil’s financial market is a major 
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obstacle to financing long-term assets. In its current form, the National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES) is the main source of long-term funding in the country. In this 
regard, the chapter “Mobilizing domestic financial resources for development,” paragraph 18, of 
the Monterrey Consensus noted that “Development banks, commercial and other financial 
institutions, whether independently or in cooperation, can be effective instruments for 
facilitating access to finance, including equity financing, for such enterprises, as well as an 
adequate supply of medium- and long- term credit” (Monterrey Consensus). To this end, 
UNCTAD’s 2013 Trade and Development Report noted that 
Public intervention in the provision of bank credit will be especially important in 
developing countries that are aiming at strengthening domestic forces of growth, since 
long-term loans for investment and innovation, as well as loans to micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises are extremely scarce even in good times. Commercial banks in 
developing countries often prefer to grant short-term personal loans or to buy 
government securities, because they consider the risks associated with maturity 
transformation (i.e. providing long-term credits matched by short-term deposits) to be 
too high…National development banks may provide financial services that private 
financial institutions are unable or unwilling to provide to the extent desired 
(UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2013, p. XVII, emphasis added). 
 As the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis unfolded, BNDES sharply increased its 
balance sheet, mainly due to massive National Treasury loans to the Brazilian Development 
Bank (figures 1 and 2). It allowed BNDES to expand its balance sheet to meet Brazil’s long-










                                                        
1
 For more details about Brazil’s response to the crisis see Barbosa (2010). 
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Figure 1 BNDES Total Assets 
 
                              Source: BNDES 
Figure 2 BNDES Funding from the National Treasury and Funds Received from the Workers' Assistance 
Fund (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador [FAT]) 
 
                              Source: BNDES 
In Brazil, since the onset of the crisis, public banks play three basic roles: 
 Act as a counter cyclical policy tool; 
 Provide financing for developing to enhance productivity growth, support for 
socioeconomic infrastructure, and knowledge-specific activities; and 
















The expansion of public banks’ balance sheets allowed policymakers to counter financial 
instability by sharply expanding credit growth when private sector (domestic and foreign) banks 
reduced bank lending (Figures 3 and 4). 
Figure 3 Counter-cyclical Lending Stabilized the System 
 
                               Source: BCB 
Figure 4 BNDES Disbursements 
 
































However, BNDES has been subject to a range of criticisms. The bank’s critics make the 
following complaints: 
 BNDES “crowds out” corporate lending by private sector banks; BNDES loans provided 
at subsidized rates generate unfair competition with private banks due to BNDES’s 
funding structure (Wheatley 2013);  
 BNDES is curbing the development of the financial sector; 
 the bank has grown too big too fast, emergency countercyclical policies implemented 
have gone on for too long (Forero 2013); and 
 Loans from the National Treasury increase gross domestic debt and it contributes to the 
weakening of Brazil’s sovereign’s financial profile, deteriorating the National Treasury 
fiscal performance, and to a rise in the government’s debt burden.  
Much of the policy discussion has been misplaced. The critics ignore the historical role 
national development banks play in fostering development at different stages of economic 
growth (UNCTAD 2013, p. 133–134). Even though Brazil’s banking sector has roughly doubled 
its lending as a share of GDP, the balance sheet profile of public and private banks reinforces 
the role of BNDES in promoting economic development through financing of long-term capital 
assets. It is ironic that critics say that “large companies have access to financial and capital 
markets, in Brazil and abroad” (Musacchio & Lazzarini 2014) to downplay BNDES’s role in 
providing funding for development when the costs of funds raised locally are substantially 
higher than the rate BNDES charges on its loans and funds raised abroad contribute 
significantly to external vulnerability.  
 It is not surprising that economists often forget history. In the past, Brazil’s increased 
external debt levels raised the country’s vulnerabilities to changes in external conditions. 
Against this background, BNDES plays a significant role in reducing external risk and external 
funding shocks—one of the root causes of the debt crisis among developing countries in the 
1980s, followed by the so-called “lost decade”—by reducing firms’ reliance on foreign markets 
as firms’ liabilities can be locally funded. The bank could be criticized for not doing enough in 
particular for Brazil’s total investment infrastructure and innovation (figures 5 and 6). Despite 
its growing investments in infrastructure, it is still small relative to Brazil’s infrastructure 




Figure 5 Disbursements by Sector 
 
                               Source: BNDES 
 
Figure 6 Federal Government Support of Innovation
2
 (Current R$) 
 
                          Source: Delgado 2012, p. 155 
For instance, the background document of the Financing for Development Office of The 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) noted that “from the 
time when the China Development bank was established in 1994 to the end of 2005, nearly 90% 
of its lending was directed towards infrastructure in eight key industries - power, road 
construction, railway, petro- chemical, coal mining, telecommunications, public facilities, and 
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 Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), the Brazilian Agency for Innovation. FNDCT: National Fund for 
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agriculture” (United Nations, 2005, 16). President Dilma Rousseff acknowledged “Brazil is 
‘two centuries’ behind when it comes to building its rail network” (Leahy 2013). Brazil’s 
transport and logistics networks face many challenges. In an attempt to boost investment, Brazil 
has introduced a series of policy initiatives such as the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC 1 
and 2), the BNDES Investment Maintenance Program (BNDES’s PSI), the National Plan for 
Transport Logistics (PNLT), and it is offering public concessions to the private sector in three 
key areas: logistics including roads, railway, ports and airports; energy; and oil and gas. 
According to Brazil’s finance minister, expected investments equal a total USD $235 billion 
over the coming years (Table 1). 
Table 1 Concessions Program Estimated Investment 
 
                  Source: Ministry of Finance 
Though it is commonly believed that BNDES led to the crowding-out of debt markets 
from corporate financing, and private banks from long-term financing loans, because the rate it 
charges on its loans to firms is less than the central bank’s benchmark SELIC (Special System 
of Clearance and Custody) overnight interest rate, the short termism in Brazil’s financial market 
is primarily due to a high and volatile SELIC rate. During the new millenium, Brazilian banks 
enjoyed a great situation by holding high-quality, high-yield, short-term assets. Due to Brazil’s 
consistently high benchmark SELIC rate, the full risk-adjusted return on liquid assets more than 
offset the full return on less liquid assets, such as consumer and business loans. It shifted banks’ 
portfolio composition towards high-quality short-term liquid government securities holdings and 
other high-yield, low-duration assets on banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, corporate lending by 

















and its high cost deters investment in capital assets. This period was characterized by large 
holdings of government securities on banks’ balance sheets and low exposure to traditional loan 
products. According to central bank data, as of August 2014, state-controlled banks are 
responsible for 53% of outstanding loans in Brazil while the share of local private-sector banks 
decreased to 32%, as they have sharply reduced loan origination over the past few years.
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though banks increased claims on the private sector as the central bank lowered its benchmark 
rate to record lows and have roughly doubled their lending as a share of GDP, the supply of 
long-term credit by private institutions remained low (Table 4).  
Though it has been argued that Brazil’s private-sector banks cannot compete with 
BNDES’s below-market rates for long-term investments, much of the policy discussion has 
been misplaced, missing the fact that Brazilian banks operate with extremely high interest rate 
spreads, high operating and loan expenses, low leverage ratios, and generate high returns on 
equity (Table 3). The spread between short-term lending rates and commercial banks’ funding 
costs for business and consumer loans is substantially higher relative to long-term financing 
activities. High returns on government securities combined with abnormally high loan spreads 
on short-term loan products generate extremely high returns on equity for private banks. The 
risk-adjusted spread of short-term loans is greater than the risk-adjusted total returns of 
financing long-term assets. As a result, Brazil’s banking sector shifted its portfolio preferences 
towards high-yield, short-term assets and generates high returns on equity with low leverage 
compared to international peers. BNDES’s competitive advantage is not due to its funding 
structure but it is primarily because it operates with low loan spreads (for direct lending 
operations, the BNDES spread is equal to its financial funding costs plus its return and a risk 
premium, as opposed to traditional private banks, which operate with extremely high loan 
spreads, high operational costs, low leverage, and high delinquency rates to generate high ROE 





                                                        
3
 As of September 2014, the five largest Brazilian banks by asset volume were: Banco do Brasil (BB- State-owned), 
Itau, Caixa Economica Federal (CEF- State-owned), Bradesco, and BNDES. The five had total assets close to US 
$2 trillion, equivalent to 71% of total banking assets. 
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Table 2 BNDES and Multilateral Agencies 
 
                 Source: BNDES financial disclosure, June 2014 
Although the conventional approach believes that Brazil’s financial system lacks saving 
and financial instruments to foster long-term investment, the primary difficulty in fostering 
long-term funding among private sector banks is the unattractiveness of long-term lending 
relative to other short-term loan products, which generate abnormally high loan spreads for 
consumer loans, such as payroll deductible loans, auto loans, and loans to firms, such as 
working capital loans, and SME loans. From this perspective, high short-term loan spreads 
distort credit markets. Moreover, privately owned banks have little interest in expanding their 
long-term loan business portfolios to provide long-term financing. Private domestic banks need 
competition from state-owned banks to make them more efficient. The Brazilian financial 
system does not lack funding mechanisms, but the difficulty is the high level and volatility of 
interest rates and the unattractiveness of low-risk adjusted returns on long-term assets relative to 
other high-yield, short-term loan segments in the presence of low-leveraged bank balance 
sheets, which dampens the development of a long-term credit market. Hence, domestic private 
banks have little interest in expanding their long-term loan business portfolios to provide long-










(US$ million) June/2014 June/2014 June/2014 Dec/2013
Total Assets 369,745 99,454 324,367 1,352,450
Equity 33,658 24,022 39,523 92,828
Net Income 2,484 235 218 13,197
Disbursement 26,697 3,014 16,03 N/A
Capitalization (%) 9.1 24.2 12.2 6.9
ROA (%) 0.7 0.2 0.1 1
ROE (%) 8.5 1 0.6 15.1
BNDES vs. Multilateral Agencies
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Table 3 Key Profitability Indicators 
 
Table 4 Loans and Onlendings Portfolio 
 
                               Source: BNDES financial disclosure, June 2014 






Return on Equity (average) (ROE) (% p.a.) 14.5 23.4 22.3 16.2 17 0.6 5.9 3.8 13.4
Net income (R$ billion) 8.2 16 6.7 13.9 12 0.5 2.9 2 19.8
Average equity (R$ bi) 56.4 68.4 30.2 85.9 70.7 80.7 48.5 52 147.4
Return on Assets (average) (ROA) (% p.a.) 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.4 1.6 0.1 1.4 0.1 0.9
Total Assets (R$ billion) 781 1219 858 1027 777 719 227 1517 2465
Total Average Assets (R$ billion) 747 1153 781 989 766 702 207 1430 2155
Average Leverage 13.3 16.8 25.8 11.5 10.8 8.7 4.3 27.5 14.6
Basil Ratio (%) 18.7 14.5 15.1 16.5 16.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Gross Interest Margin (Gross income from financial 
intermediation / Average Fixed Income Portfolio) (% p.a.) 2.0% 2.6% 2.6% 3.6% 3.0% 0.7% 1.9% -0.2% 2.3%
Gross Income from financial intermediation (R$ billion) 12.5 25 19.2 28.3 19.5 4.8 4 -2.3 49.9
Gross Income (excluding allowance for credit risk) (Gross 
income from financial intermediation excluding allowance for 
credit risk / Average Fixed Income Portfolio)      (% p.a.) 1.9% 4.2% 3.9% 6.0% 5.1% 0.7% 2.0% -0.2% 2.3%
Gross Income from financial intermediation (excluding allowance for 
credit risk) (R$ billion) 11.7 41.1 28.4 46.8 32.9 4.8 4.1 -2.3 49
Profitability












Net Portfolio (after allowance for credit 
risk) / Total Assets (%) 72.4 53.7 66.3 39.3 42 43.8 72.6 85 90
Net Portfolio (R$ billion) 565 655 569 403 326 315 165 1290 2219
Average Fixed Income Portfolio (Credit and 
Treasury) (R$ billion) 624 980 731 778 641 730 206 1430 2205
Long Term Credit Operations / Gross 
Portfolio (%) 80.8 61.9 75.5 43.6 46.2 96.5 92.8 N.A. 89.6
Rating AA-C Credit Operations / 
Portfolio (%) 99.7 95 92.8 91.9 92.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Non-performing balance / Gross 
Portfolio (%) 0.01 1.13 1.36 2.71 2.52 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A
Notes:
* Sources: Bacen-Top 50 Reports and 
Financial Demonstrations.
* Informations from the years ended on 
12/31/2013, 06/30/2013 (BIRD) and 
12/31/2012 (CDB).
* Long Term Credit Operations: >1 year
Loans and Onlendings Portfolio
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Policy Alternatives to Promote Long-term Financing 
As noted earlier, for the past six years, policy makers relied on the expansion of BNDES’s 
balance sheet through National Treasury loans and infusions of capital to fund private sector 
investment projects. In this regard, the composition of its liabilities changed significantly and 
the treasury is currently its major source of funding (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 BNDES Balance Sheet 
 
       Source: BNDES financial disclosure June-2014 
 
BNDES’s balance sheet has expanded primarily due to treasury loans to BNDES, which, 
as of 2014, represent 53.2% of its liabilities. In Brazil, provisional measures subsequently 
transformed into law authorize domestic on-lendings to BNDES from the National Treasury in 
which the latter issues securities through direct placement to BNDES. This transaction involves 
the creation of assets for the National Treasury (claims on BNDES) and the corresponding 
issuance of liabilities—government securities—by the National Treasury. For BNDES, their 
liabilities increase by the amount of the transfer of securities it holds as assets. This transaction 
is recorded as an electronic book entry and the net effect on the public debt is zero, though gross 
debt goes up by the amount of the government securities issued. However, this policy raised 
several criticisms due to the increase in gross public debt caused by the direct issuance of 
securities to BNDES.  
 
R$	billion
2014 % 2013 2012 2011 2010
Cash 2.7 0.3% 0.5 10.3 5.4 10.1
Loans 588.3 72.2% 565.2 492.1 425.5 361.6
Equity	Investments1 82.4 10.1% 85.8 94.4 99.6 107.5
Securities 98.3 12.1% 91 86.5 73.9 50
Others 42.6 5.2% 39.5 32.3 20.4 19.8
Total	Assets 814.3 100.0% 782 715.6 624.8 549
FAT 192.4 23.6% 176.2 161.9 146.3 132.3
PIS/PASEP 33.6 4.1% 33.6 32.8 31.7 30.8
National	Treasury 433.2 53.2% 413.2 376 310.8 253.1
International	Borrowings 34.7 4.3% 31.2 23.3 22.4 19.8
Others 46.3 5.7% 67.1 69.4 52.6 47.2
Shareholdes	Equity 74.1 9.1% 60.7 52.2 61 65.9





Figure 7 Public Sector Gross and Net Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
                           Source: Brazilian Central Bank 
For this reason, much of the recent discussion about BNDES’s role centers around the 
fiscal costs associated with National Treasury loans to BNDES—which sharply increased since 
2009—focusing on whether it produces a net cost or a net gain for the federal government 
(Garcia 2011b). Moreover, critics point to the negative carry operation for the treasury as the 
costs associated with government securities are higher than the TJLP, that is, the rate the 
Treasury charges on its loans to BNDES. Finally, funding from the National Treasury has been 
criticized on various grounds such as “dangerous creative accounting,” “accounting gimmicks,” 
“discredited fiscal accounting,” and “sequence of assaults on our public accounts” (Garcia 
2010). 
Though critics of BNDES’s balance sheet expansion point to increasing fiscal risk, they 
fail to understand that the federal government spends by crediting bank accounts and taxes by 
debiting them. Government expenditures increase reserves in the banking system. The federal 
government is the only net supplier of reserves, so that when they spend, there is an injection of 
reserves in the banking system and when taxes are collected reserves are destroyed. As we have 
argued elsewhere (Rezende 2009), excess reserves tend to put a downward pressure on the 
SELIC rate, which triggers the sale of government securities to remove those excess reserves 

























































































the Brazilian central bank. As long as the Brazilian central bank operates with a positive SELIC 
rate target, it must intervene in the market to maintain the SELIC rate close to the target.  
 
Funding Options for BNDES 
By using a basic system of accounting in which for every financial asset there is a 
corresponding liability, we can evaluate and simulate the existing and alternative funding 
options for BNDES. We can analyze the following alternatives: a) loans from the National 
Treasury at TJLP to BNDES; b) loans from the Brazilian Central Bank; c) credit to BNDES’s 
reserve account at the central bank using the National Treasury account with the BCB; and d) 
BNDES issuance of bonds. 
 
a) Loans from the National Treasury to BNDES 
In its current form, loans from the National Treasury at TJLP (the long-term interest rate) to 
BNDES are extended through direct placement of government securities to BNDES, which then 
sells government securities on its portfolio as needed to increase its disbursements to provide 
long-term credit. As BNDES sells government securities on its portfolio, its reserve account 
balance with the central bank goes up. As it extends new loans to the private sector, its reserve 
balance goes down by the amount of the loan, and its loan portfolio increases. This transaction 
is equivalent to a swap of assets on BNDES’s balance sheet. The loan beneficiary’s bank 
account balance goes up and there is a corresponding increase in reserve balances on the 
borrowers’ bank. Note that the increase in reserve balances will put a downward pressure on the 
overnight lending rate, triggering the intervention of the central bank through bond sales to 





Figure 1:  Loans from the National Treasury at TJLP to BNDES
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
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BNDES extends loans to the private sector
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
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So, the final position for each unit is the following: BNDES has an asset (the loan) 
matched by a liability (loans from the National Treasury); the borrowers’ bank holds 
government securities as assets and deposits as liabilities; the borrower has increased its 
liabilities by the amount of the loan from BNDES and its deposit balance has increased by the 
amount of the loan. On the consolidated balance sheet of the government, its asset increased by 
the amount of claims of the private sector by issuing liabilities (government securities). 
 
b) Loans from BCB at TJLP  
Since last June, BNDES has had direct access to Brazil’s payment system (SPB) and it has a 
reserve account at the central bank to settle payments and transactions. This initiative creates the 
possibility to provide alternative sources of funding for BNDES. An alternative approach would 
be to allow the central bank to credit BNDES’s reserve account. This funding option is not 
radically new.  
Historically, central banks have used a wide variety of instruments to channel long-term 
finance in support of development objectives, including direct financing of non-financial 
firms…Central bank and government intervention in credit allocation became 
widespread in the immediate post-war period in developed and developing 
countries alike (UNCTAD 2013, p.133-134).  
 In this way, BNDES’s assets would go up by the same amount and its liabilities 
(borrowings from the central bank) would go up by the amount of the loan. It would allow 
BNDES to engage in direct lending and would also allow the maturity transformation inside the 
banking system. By extending loans, BNDES would increase its credit portfolio and its reserve 
balance with the central bank would go down. On the other hand, the bank’s account balance 
with the central bank increases, matched by an increase in its deposit liabilities. The loan 
recipient’s account balance at its bank would go up, matched by an increase in its liabilities 
(loans from BNDES). This increase in reserve balances at depository institutions puts a 
downward pressure on the SELIC rate and triggers the sale by the central bank of government 
securities to drain reserve balances from the banking system to keep the SELIC rate close to its 




 Note that on the consolidated balance sheet of the government it has an asset—claims on 
the private sector—matched by an increase in its liabilities (borrowed reserves). 
 
c) Credit BNDES’s Reserve Account at the Central Bank using the National Treasury Account     
with the BCB 
In this case, the National Treasury’s reserve balances with the central bank go down by the 
amount of the loan and BNDES’s balance at the central bank goes up by the same amount, 
matched by a corresponding increase in its liabilities. It can then extend new loans so reserve 
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balances go down and its loan portfolio goes up. The borrower’s account goes up and its bank 
reserve balances go up, adding reserves to the banking system, which will put downward 
pressure on the SELIC rate, triggering securities sales by the central bank.  
 
Figure 3:  Credit BNDES’s reserve account at the central bank using the National Treasury account with the BCB
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The final position for BNDES, the borrower, and its bank is the same as in the case in 
which the Treasury transfers government securities to BNDES. 
 
d) BNDES Issues Bonds Before it Can Extend New Loans 
In this case, BNDES issues bonds to raise funds to extend new loans. Its reserve balance at the 
central bank goes up by the amount of the bond sale.  
 
Figure 4:   BNDES issues bonds
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Note that regardless of the funding alternative, the increase in reserve balances tends to 
put downward pressure on the SELIC rate, which will trigger the sale for securities to remove 
excess reserve balances in the system. Moreover, the final balance sheet position is the same in 
all those funding options: BNDES has a claim on the private sector, the National Treasury (or 
the central bank) has a claim on BNDES, the firm has a loan, and the bank holds government 
securities. Note that in the fourth case, the bank has a claim on BNDES, that is, it holds a 
government liability. These transactions reflect the basic principle that economic units buy 
assets by issuing liabilities. It reflects the endogenous money approach in which “banks ‘create 
credit,’ that is, that they create deposits in their act of lending” (Schumpeter 1954: 1080). Just 
like Minsky observed, economic units buy assets by issuing IOUs. For Minsky, “Banking is not 
money lending; to lend, a money lender must have money. The fundamental banking activity is 
accepting, that is, guaranteeing that some party is creditworthy” (Minsky 1986: 256).  
This approach to banking sees money creation as going from banks’ assets to liabilities. 
Banks purchase assets (such as the liabilities of borrowers, IOUs) through the issuance of 
liabilities (such as deposits, banks’ IOUs). The federal government operates in a similar way as 
it buys assets (claims on the nongovernment sector) by issuing its own IOUs (either reserves or 
government securities). This transaction should not be seen as an accounting trick, but rather 
those funding options presented above represent accounting transactions with government debt 
(either reserves or government securities).  
However, the design and reform of financing mechanisms involves a political choice 
about how to direct and allocate public resources. For instance, the financing agreement 
between the National Treasury and BNDES stipulates the costs of treasury loans tied to the 
TJLP, currently at 5%, and the costs of securities issued by the Treasury is approximated by the 











Figure 8 SELIC Rate and TJLP (Long-term Interest Rate) 
 
                      Source: BCB 
Critics point to the negative carry of treasury loans represented by the difference 
between the SELIC rate and the long-term interest rate (TJLP). Most economists believe that in 
order to decrease the subsidy implicit in BNDES’s loans, the TJLP should be close, if not equal, 
to the SELIC rate. One group argues that the government should raise (Garcia 2014) the TJLP 
toward the SELIC rate, while the other group suggests that the SELIC rate should fall toward 
the long-term rate (Romero 2014). However, the proposal to increase the TJLP would decrease 
the demand price of an investment project, that is, it decreases the present value of the 
discounted expected future cash flows of an investment project, so fewer investment projects 
will be more profitable relative to money. As is well known, Keynes proposed policies that 
would increase expected future cash flows and reduce the interest rate, thus increasing the 
demand price relative to the supply price of capital assets. As Keynes noted, “those assets of 
which the normal supply-price is less than the demand-price will be newly produced; and these 
will be those assets of which the marginal efficiency would be greater than the rate of interest” 
(Keynes, 1936, p.228). That is, an increase in the TJLP lowers the demand price relative to the 
supply price of capital assets, deterring investment, as investors would require higher return 









































































Moreover, not only do investors have to formulate expectations about future cash flows 
(or future “q”s) but they have to form expectations about future interest rates which are included 
in the calculation of the project’s net present value. This is a system in which expectations of 
future conditions determine present decisions. As Keynes put it, “it is by reason of the existence 
of durable capital equipment that the economic future is linked to the present” (Keynes 1936, 
p.146). Changes in the market interest rate level bring about change in the NPV of an 
investment project. Interest rate volatility affects the real economy through changes in the 
discount factor of investment decisions. Thus a high and volatile interest rate increases 
uncertainty associated with productive investments. From this perspective, funding from 
BNDES at a relatively stable long-term interest rate (TJLP) reduces the uncertainty involved in 
predicting changes in the future path of interest rates, considering the riskiness of each 
individual project.  
 
Long-term Funding Options Involving Domestic Capital Markets 
There has been much discussion about the development of longer-term private finance. Though 
much of the discussion agrees that a basic requirement to foster long-term funding is low 
interest rates, it overlooks the fact this alternative requires low and stable market interest rates. 
As noted earlier, banks can operationally finance long-term assets by issuing government-
insured deposit liabilities and profit from a steep and normal-shaped yield curve. However, the 
financing of long-term assets by them would impose significant asset liability mismatches on 
banks’ balance sheets. The important question is related to the costs of carrying a mismatch 
between the duration of assets and liabilities on bank balance sheets as long as interest and 
funding risks are carried on their books.  
 A number of policy initiatives designed to encourage local private banks and capital 
markets to provide funding to support long-term investment have been implemented and 
tailored to meet investors’ needs, such as private sector long-term bonds, credit rights 
investment funds, infrastructure bonds, and infrastructure bonds investment funds. One of the 
main challenges is the creation of long-maturity instruments to be sold to investors with long-
time horizons. Recent efforts by policymakers directed at lengthening the duration of bank 
liabilities included the development of financial bills (letras financeiras), thus imposing maturity 
matching on banks’ books. Though it is believed that this policy initiative raises funding to 
finance long-term assets, it is rather an asset liability management (ALM) strategy to reduce the 
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IRR on banks’ balance sheets by increasing the duration of liabilities, thus reducing the 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. 
A basic requirement for the development of long-term financing by the private sector is 
low and stable interest rates to induce investors to hold long-term financial assets. Though 
modern central banks implement policy by operating with a short-term interest rate target to 
influence the longer end of the yield curve, Keynes would have supported a policy to influence 
the entire yield curve. The central bank would announce targets for the whole yield curve and it 
would buy and sell securities at prices compatible with the targeted yields.
5
 
First, by reducing interest rate volatility, the monetary authority can effectively induce 
financial institutions to “move out the yield curve” by targeting long-term interest rates and 
reducing future rate uncertainty. A basic requirement for banks’ exposure to long-term fixed 
assets is an upward sloping yield curve and a stable interest rate environment to mitigate interest 
rate risk. In the presence of a stable and low yield curve, banks could ride the yield curve and 
raise returns. A steep treasury yield curve and the promise that short-term interest rates would 
remain low for an extended period would provide the basis for financial institutions to profit 
from a steeper yield curve. A reduction in expected rate volatility minimizes the expectation of 
capital losses on long-term bond positions, encouraging financial institutions to profitably ride 
the yield curve (Rezende 2014b). As a result, if those conditions are fulfilled, we can foresee 
banks lengthening the maturity of their assets. To this end, the Brazilian central bank can 
determine the term structure of risk-free interest rates by setting both the long-term rate and the 
short-term rate. Keynes (1936) correctly criticized central banks’ decision to operate only in 
short-term debt markets:  
The monetary authority often tends in practice to concentrate upon short-term debts and 
to leave the price of long-term debts to be influenced by belated and imperfect reactions 
from the price of short-term debts; — though here again there is no reason why they 
need do so. (Keynes 1936:206)   
He goes on to say that “open-market operations have been limited to the purchase of very short-
dated securities, the effect may, of course, be mainly confined to the very short-term rate of 
                                                        
5
 Though the transmission mechanism of monetary policy by changing the overnight lending rate is supposed to 
have an impact on the level of economic activity by changing bank lending, this effect is uncertain and indirect. 




interest and have but little reaction on the much more important long-term rates of interest.” 
(Keynes 1936:197). He then concluded that:  
If the monetary authority were prepared to deal both ways on specified terms in debts of 
all maturities, and even more so if it were prepared to deal in debts of varying degrees of 
risk… The complex of rates of interest would simply be an expression of the terms on 
which the banking system is prepared to acquire or part with debts…Perhaps a complex 
offer by the central bank to buy and sell at stated prices gilt-edged bonds of all 
maturities, in place of the single bank rate for short-term bills, is the most important 
practical improvement which can be made in the technique of monetary management 
(Keynes, 1936: 205, emphasis added). 
In order to set interest rates of longer term debt, the central bank should offer interest-
bearing term deposits for different maturities to support longer term rates. In fact, the Treasury-
Fed accord created a system of pegged rates generating an upward sloping yield curve. Financial 
institutions sold short-term instruments, such as three-month Treasury Bills, to buy long-term 
instruments. This policy was so successful that it was necessary to “limit bank purchases of 
long-term debt” (Meltzer 2003, 591). This policy created an increase in the demand for long-
term securities and “by 1945 the Federal Reserve had acquired almost all of the outstanding 
bills” (Meltzer 2003, 596).  
In addition to low and stable interest rates to foster private sector investment in long-
term assets, the policy alternatives to augment investment involve the private and the public 
sector, that is, the federal government could undertake investment projects itself through fiscal 
policy or allow BNDES to fund long-term investment activities so the private sector can 
undertake such projects. Though public investment has increased, it has remained low compared 
to Brazil’s investment needs (Rezende 2014).  
In Keynes’s framework, the condition required to get expansion of output is to produce a 
situation of normal backwardation in which spot prices are below forward prices and prices of 
production of future commodities are below the forward price of future commodities. If spot 
prices are below the forward price, investors will start to buy stocks that exist because they are 
going to profit from holding the stocks and selling them forward.
6
 This will reduce the 
available/current supplies so that individuals can expand production of output in order to sell 
forward, leading to an increase in employment. The idea of normal backwardation can be seen 
as the motor force for expansion in the economy. The expansion of output requires changes in 
                                                        
6
 See Kregel (2010) for a detailed exposition of Keynes’s contributions to the theory of finance. 
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the spot price relative to the forward price, that is, backwardation will lead to profit incentives 
that will encourage individuals to invest, leading to an expansion of output through the 
multiplier process. In this regard, though public banks play an important role in promoting real 
capital development and dampening market instability, their actions must be coordinated with 
macro policies to keep the economy in a quasi-boom state and prevent depressions.  
Keynes’s economic policy views went beyond public spending as a counter-cyclical 
policy tool. Public sector policy, by using the fiscal powers of the federal government, should be 
designed to fully mobilize unexploited domestic resources. In Keynes’s framework, in order to 
smooth the cyclical movements of employment and output, we should set the market interest 
rate as low as possible, so that carrying costs of holding commodities are low, and reduce excess 
stocks by buying existing commodities or existing capital stock. At the same time, it is 
necessary to shorten the time interval in which investors run off excess capacity. That is, the 
government has to step in as a buyer, reducing excess stocks and excess productive capacity. As 
government purchases increase, capacity utilization also increases, and it will reach a state in 




As noted earlier, banks can finance long-term assets by issuing short-term liabilities. If the 
current administration wants to encourage funding of long-term assets from private banks, then 
it could allow them to borrow at the discount window at low rates such as the TJLP to fund 
long-term assets. Initially, the credit line could be up to one-third of banks’ equity.
7
 This 
proposal deals with potential liquidity problems due to the maturity mismatch. However, there 
still exists IRR on banks’ balance sheets. Alternatively, banks could sell their long-term 
portfolio to BNDES so private banks would avoid the IRR due to the funding of long-term 
assets with short-term liabilities. BNDES would buy these long-term assets using reserves 
balances. In this regard, private banks would focus on their specialization in underwriting. On 
the originators’ balance sheet, we would have maturity matching, that is, reserves as assets and 
short-term liabilities, and BNDES would hold long-term assets on its portfolio.    
 
                                                        
7
 This rule is arbitrary and ultimately depends on the country’s long-term investment needs, the availability of real 
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